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264 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
In a convincing, and well-reasoned opinion rendered by Mr. Sutherland, A. J.,
the Court held that the statute under consideration did not come within any of
the four classes heretofore mentioned, and that the setting of standards of mini-
mum wages would be extending the police power too far and would be an in-
fringement of the rights and liberties guaranteed to every citizen by the Consti-
tution and the amendments thereto. The Court points out with special emphasis
wherein the statute under consideration differs from those laws fixing hours of
labor. The Court says: "it is sufficient now to point out that the latter dealg
with the incidents of employment having no necessary effect upon the heart of the
contract; that is, the amount of wages to be paid and received. A law forbid-
ding work to continue beyond a certain number of hours leaves the parties free
to contract about wages, and therefore equalize what additional burdens are
placed beyond the employer as a result of the restrictions as to hours, by or
adjustment in respect of the amount of wages."
Furthermore, in order for an act to be sustained upon the ground of police
power it must be shown that the subject to be corrected is directly connected
with the public health or morals. The mere assertion that the subject relates,
though but in a remote degree, to the public health or morals does not neces-
sarily render the enactment valid. The Court commented on this phase of the
case, saying: "It cannot be shown that well-paid women safeguard their morals
more carefully than those who are poorly paid; morality rests upon other con-
siderations than wages." The Court further points out that the statute does not
take cognizance of the earning power of the employee, the number of hours which
happen to constitute a working day; and while it has no basis to support its
validity other than the assumed necessities of the employee, it takes no account of
other sources of income she may have. It also follows that if a minimum wage
can be established, thus limiting the employer's freedom of contract, should the
occasion demand it, a maximum wage could be set, thus limiting the employee's
right of contract. C. J. Taft and A. J. Holmes dissented from the decision, both
of them believing that the statute was analogous to those statutes limiting the
hours of labor, but Taft, C. J., carefully refrained from intimating what
his opinion was as to the constitutionality of a minimum wage law for men.
MONOPOLY-FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION-JURISDICTION-
GASOLINE TANKS AND PUMPS.
Federal Trade Commission, Petitioner, v. Sinclair Refining Company (No,
213) (U. S. Sup. Ct. Advs. Ops. May 1, '23, page 483). Federal Trade Com-
mission, Petitioner, v. Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) (No. 637). Federal
Trade Commission, Petitioner, v. Gulf Refining Company (No. 638). Federal
Trade Commission, Petitioner, v. Maloney Oil & Manufacturing Company
(No. 639).
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REVIEW QF RECENT DFCISION S
On writs of certiorari to the United States Courts of Appeals for the third
and seventh circuits, to review judgments nullifying orders of the Federal Trade
Commission requiring the abandonment of the practice of leasing tanks and
pnmps for the handling of petroleum products. Affirmed.
The practice engaged in by the respondents in this case and held to be an
unfair method of competition in interstate commerce, was substantially the fol-
lowing: The respondents, refiners and wholesalers of petroleum products, leased
underground tanks with pumps to retail dealers at nominal prices and upon con-
dition that the equipment should be used only with gasoline supplied by the les-
sor. The lease also provided that "Upon the termination of this license, by. what-
ever means effected, the party of the first part shall have the right to enter upon
said premises and remove the said equipment and each and every part thereof;
provided, however, that the party of the second part shall have the right and
option at such time to purchase said equipment by paying therefor the sum
Of * * *."
In delivering the opinion of the Court Mr. Justice McReynolds said, in part:
"Respondents' written contract does not undertake to limit the lessee's right to
use or deal in the goods of a competitor of the lessor, but leaves him free to
follow his own judgment. It is not properly described in the complaint, and is
not within the letter of the Clayton Act."
"There is no covenant in the present contract which obligates the lessee not
to sell the goods of another; and its language cannot be so construed. * * *
Many competitors seek to sell excellent brands of gasoline, and no one of them
is essential to the retail business. The lessee is free to buy where he chooses; he
may freely accept and use as many pumps as he wishes, and may discontinue any
or all of them. He may carry on business as his judgment dictates and his
means permit, save only that he cannot use the lessor's equipment for dispensing
another's brand. By investing a comparatively small sum, he can buy an outfit
and use it without hindrance. He can have the respondents' gasoline, with the
pump or without the pump, and many competitors seek to supply his needs."
"Is the challenged practiced an unfair method of competition within the
meaning of Sec. 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act? Reviewing the cir-
cumstances, four circuit courts of appeals have answered 'no'. And we can find
no reason for a contrary conclusion. Certainly, the practice is not opposed to
good morals because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression.
* * * It has been openly adopted by many competiting concerns. * * * The
contract, open and fair upon its face, provides an unconstrained recipient with
free receptacle and pump for storing, dispensing, advertising, and protecting the
lessor's brand. * * * No purpose or power to acquire unlawful monopoly has
been disclosed, and the record does not show that the probable defect of the
practice will be unduly to lessen competition."
"The powers of the commission are limited by the statutes. It has no gen-
eral authority to compel competitors to a common level, to interfere with ordi-
nary business methods, or to preseribe arbitrary standards for those engaged in
the conflict for advantage called 'competition'."
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